Our empirical study begins with the relation between the levels of compensation and bank assets for newly hired CEOs. Then we study how the compensation of continuing CEOs responds to performance based on stock returns and accounting earnings. We examine how CEO experience affects the sensitivity of pay to performance and whether actual or relative performance matters.
In the next section we explore how the correlation between the levels of compensation and assets varies with CEO experience. The variations in this correlation depend on the growth of compensation, considered in the previous section, and also on the growth of assets. In addition, the correlation would be affected by CEO turnover if there is a systematic tendency to terminate CEOs who perform the poorest.
The final section uses logit regressions to relate the probability of CEO turnover to age and performance. We consider the effects from marketand accounting-based returns, the distinction between actual and relative performance, and the effects of experience. The results for turnover provide a number of interesting comparisons with those for compensation growth.
A Model of Bank Size, CEO Compensation, and Performance
We begin with a simple theoretical model that allows for matching between the size of a bank and the quality (and hence compensation) of the CEO. The production function for bank i is yi = XiF(ki, Ai),
where Xi is a technological or resource factor for the bank, ki is the anticipated skill level of the CEO, and Ai represents bank assets or, more generally, an array of inputs that includes labor. In Rosen's (1982) model, CEO skill involves the quality of decisions ("general atmosphere") and the ability to supervise. The units are defined so that a CEO with twice as much supervisory talent can administer twice as many people at a given level of effectiveness. For a given quality of decision making, it is natural to assume constant returns to scale in the other inputs, including supervisory talent. Because F( * ) exhibits constant returns to inputs aside from decisionmaking ability, it must show increasing returns with respect to all inputs. The bank's net revenue is Xin F(ki, Ai) -v(ki) -rAi,
where r, the constant cost for assets, represents payments to depositors or the opportunity cost for equity. The bank faces the CEO wage function, v(ki) with v'> 0, that relates CEO compensation, vi, to the level of skill, ki. The function v(ki) is determined in the overall population, as in Rosen ( 1982) , by the distribution of the supply of CEO talent and by the demand for CEO skill (from banks and also from other companies if CEO talent is substitutable across fields). The bank chooses ki and Ai (and other inputs) to maximize its net revenue. The second-order conditions for this maximization require v" > 0; that is, at least in the neighborhood of the selected ki, CEO pay must rise at an increasing rate with the level of skill. Since the function v(k) must satisfy this condition in a full equilibrium, we assume that v" > 0 applies.
The conditions for maximization of net revenue determine Ai and kiand therefore vi = v(ki) -as functions of Xi and r. For given r, an increase in Xi implies increases in Ai, ki, and vi; that is, better institutions (higher Xi) are larger in the sense that they assemble more assets, hire a better CEO (higher ki), and pay the CEO more (higher vi).
An increase in Xi lowers the ratio of CEO skill to size, ki/Ai, because an increase in ki raises the marginal cost of CEO talent, v'(ki), relative to the constant marginal cost, r, of assets. The behavior of the ratio of CEO pay to assets, vi/Ai, is unclear because vi/ki tends to rise with ki. Typical empirical results indicate that the elasticity of CEO pay with respect to a size variable, such as bank assets, is positive, less than one, and roughly constant at about one-third. This finding means that the ratio vi/Ai declines as Xi increases; a result that is possible but not inevitable within the model.
The analysis treated ki and Ai as freely adjustable inputs. This treatment of ki seems most appropriate at the time a CEO is installed.' Therefore, our initial empirical analysis deals with the relation between compensation and bank assets during a CEO's initial year in office. However, the variable vi should be interpreted as the expected present value of compensation attached to becoming the CEO of bank i. We consider below the relation of this present value to the compensation in the initial year in office, which we denote by wiI.
There are adjustment costs associated with changes in assets Ai (or numbers of employees and other inputs). In fact, variations in Ai across firms for historical reasons, rather than because of differences in current technological parameters Xi, can also be viewed as generating cross-sectional dispersion in ki and vi. That is, bigger banks tend to hire better CEOs even if these banks do not currently have access to better production functions.
We consider now the change in compensation over time, assuming that the CEO remains in office. Later we allow for CEO turnover and for ' This freedom of choice may be limited if, as is usually the case, the promotion to CEO comes from within the company rather than as an appointment from outside. (In our sample, 46 of the 60 newly installed CEOs, or 76%, had more than 1 year of prior tenure on the corporate board.) Lazear and Rosen ( 1981 ) argue that the selection as CEO should be viewed as the final match of an extended tournament involving insiders. growth in bank assets. In determining the growth of compensation, we assume that the bank's directors-acting in the interest of the bank's owners-use information revealed by two kinds of variables: measures of the bank's performance for year t, PERFit, and corresponding measures of performance for a peer group of banks, denoted by PERF>*. In the empirical analysis, PERF* is the average of PERF -for year t and for the geographical region where bank i is located.
We begin with the hypothesis that the growth of compensation, log(wit/ wit_,), corresponds to the growth of the CEO's expected marginal product. Thus, the change in pay considers new information about the CEO's skill level, ki, and also allows for shifts in production conditions (F(.) in eq.
[1 ]) or factor supplies (v( * ) or r in eq. [2 ]). This analysis abstracts from explicit or implicit labor contracts that allow for significant departures of the growth in compensation from the growth in expected marginal product.2
The main information about CEO talent comes from the observation of relative performance, PERFit = PERFj, -PERF (see Holmstrom 1982 ). Consider the model PERFit = a + Pki + i, t = 1, 2,...,
where a and 13 are known constants and sit has zero mean and constant variance a2. The formulation assumes that the skill level of the average CEO is a known constant; in particular, it is unnecessary to learn about this average value. The expected value of ki conditioned on data through T years in office, denoted by E(ki) T, depends on the sample mean of the PERFit and on the prior information about ki that was used in the initial hiring decision. Suppose that this prior information is equivalent in terms of information content to To observations on PERFit, where To need not be an integer. Then it is straightforward to show that the relation between E(ki) ITand PERFit involves the coefficient 1 /( To + T). Therefore, a higher level of experience, T, implies a smaller sensitivity of E(ki) I T to PERFit.3 For given ki, the CEO's value of marginal product varies with disturbances that are industry-or region-or economywide. We assume that these elements are captured by the aggregate performance variable, 2 Becker and Stigler (1975), Lazear (1979) , and others argue that deferred compensation has desirable incentive effects on workers. This pattern requires significant departures of wages from expected marginal products.
3 See Murphy (1986) for a similar result. The analysis is more complicated if the CEO's skill changes over time. Holmstrom (1983, sec. 1.2) assumes that the skill level, kit, evolves as a random walk. The sensitivity of E(ki,) I T to performance still diminishes with T, but this sensitivity now approaches an asymptote that is positive rather than zero. 
(To + T)it
The constant term a reflects growth in value of marginal product associated with greater experience of the CEO or with industry-or region-or economywide productivity growth.
The specification in equation (4) implies that CEOs assume compensation risk associated with uncertainty about aggregate effects, PERF*, and relative performance, PERFit. The bank could insure the CEO against aggregate risk by setting compensation independently of PERF*. In this case,the growth in compensation in equation (4) would depend only on relative performance, PERFit (see Holmstrom 1979) .
One attraction of relative-performance agreements is that the aggregate variable PERFj* cannot be manipulated significantly by a single CEO. Nevertheless, these kinds of contracts create problems associated with the presence of gaps between wages and expected marginal products: (1) if a favorable realization of PERFI results in an excess of the expected marginal product over the wage, the CEO can quit; (2) if an unfavorable realization of PERFj*t creates an excess of the wage over the expected marginal product, the bank can effectively renege by treating the CEO badly; and (3) insulation of wit from aggregate variables gives the CEO insufficient incentive to take actions that mitigate the effects of aggregate disturbances on an individual bank's performance (see Jensen and Murphy 1988, p. 17) . The benefit from insulating compensation growth from aggregate performance is also likely to be small. If the CEO cares a great deal about aggregate risk, then he can insure himself by taking the appropriate position in the stock market (e.g., by going short on a portfolio of bank stocks). Because the benefits are small and the costs are likely to be significant, we do not anticipate that CEO contracts would be sheltered from aggregate performance. In any event, the effect of PERF *t in equation (4) 
Setup of the Empirical Analysis
The empirical work uses a new panel data set on CEO compensation for large U.S. commercial banks over the period 1982-87. From the standpoint of testing theories about executive compensation, the banking industry is attractive because of the presence of a large number of firms that produce a similar product. The sample of 83 banks is a subset of the 140 banks that ranked highest in assets in 1986. Attrition of the sample occurred because of unavailable data, sometimes because banks disappeared as independent entities or were foreign owned (and therefore did not file disclosure statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]).4 These considerations mean that some banks appear in the sample for some years but not others. Table 1 In a preliminary study of a dozen banks, the compensation figures were expanded from salary and bonus to include the estimated value of stock options granted and some elements of deferred compensation. Because the information about stock options, including when they were granted, was often incomplete, it was not possible to value these options precisely or to assign them unambiguously to a particular year. The expanded figures on compensation differed from salary and bonus by an amount that was volatile across years and banks. However, the general nature of the relation between compensation and other variables did not depend very much on whether narrow or broad compensation was used. For this reason, the present study is limited to compensation in the form of salary and bonus.
Results for the Initial Year in Office
Over the period 1982-87 there are 60 observations on CEOs in their first year of office. For these new CEOs, the regression of log(real compensation) on log(real assets) is log(wit) =-3.84 + .316 * log(Ait), (0.30) (.032) Beckmann (1960) and including more substantial recent models by Rosen (1982) and Keren and Levhari (1983) . Although these theories can rationalize the positive relation between CEO pay and size, the puzzle is why the relation is so similar across industries and time and why the estimated elasticity of pay with respect to size is usually close to one-third.
Shifts in the CEO wage function, v( )-which might reflect changes in the aggregate demand for CEOs-could shift the relation between compensation and assets. The regression in equation (5) 
Results on Changes in Compensation for Continuing CEOs
Equation (4) brought in performance and applied to the change in pay over time for CEOs that remained in office. In the empirical analysis, the wage for year t represents partly base salary set at the beginning of the year and partly bonus set at the beginning of the next year. (The data set does not include a separation between base salary and bonus.) Performance for year t could affect this year's pay (especially through the bonus) and also next year's pay (especially through the base salary).
Two measures of performance turned out to be important empirically: real rate of return to shareholders (based on stock-market prices and dividend yields) and accounting-based real rate of return. Even if shareholders care only about market returns, the accounting returns may provide independent information about CEO ability or effort (see Holmstrom [1979] , sec. 4, for a general discussion). Therefore, it is reasonable that both measures of performance matter for the change in compensation.
The variable RSit is the total real rate of return (real stock-price appre- The serial correlation of the residuals from equation (7) is negative but insignificantly different from zero. For example, a regression of the residuals at date t on those at date t -1 (231 observations) yields the estimated coefficient -.088, SE = .061. Similarly, if the first lag of the dependent variable is added to equation (7), the estimated coefficient (231 observations) is negative but insignificantly different from zero: -.079, SE = .059.
The relation estimated in equation (7) table 9 ) indicate an estimated coefficient on the contemporaneous stock return of .086, SE = .009. He also reports a significant coefficient on the growth rate of real sales: .255, SE = .023. We found (see below) that an analogous variable for banksgrowth rate of real assets-was insignificant once we held fixed the change in the accounting return, ARAjt, and the lagged stock return, which is included in RS2it.
Since the sample means (for the 330 observations used in eq.
[7]) of RS2j, and ARAsi are .176 and -.035, respectively, equation (7) implies that real compensation for continuing CEOs grew on average by 9.4% per year (which is the sample mean of log(wjt/wji_)-see App. table Al). From the standpoint of marginal productivity theory, this average growth rate reflects the effects on productivity from greater CEO experience and also from advances in the overall industry and economy.
Since the sample standard deviation of RS2-t is .24, the coefficient of .174 in equation (7) means that a one-standard-deviation move in stockholders' returns generates a shift in the annual growth rate of real compensation by 4.1 percentage points-almost half of the sample mean of log(wit/witi1). With a standard deviation for ARAit of .097, a one-standarddeviation change in this variable has a similar quantitative effect on log(wit/ wit-1). Thus, executive compensation is highly sensitive to performance.
Effects of CEO Experience
The theoretical discussion implied that the response of compensation to performance diminishes in magnitude as experience increases. As predicted, the change in compensation is more sensitive to performance at lower levels of experience.8 A joint test of the hypothesis that the coefficients of each performance variable are the same over the two ranges of experience leads to the statistic F'325 = 7.0, which exceeds the 1% critical value of 4.7. The evidence that the sensitivity attenuates with experience is clearer for accounting-based performance than for market-based performance. For the variable ARA&t alone, the hypothesis of equality of the coefficients over the two ranges of experience corresponds to the statistic t325 = 3.4, which is significant at less than the 1% level. For the variable RS2it alone, the corresponding statistic is t325 = 1.7. This statistic is significant at the 5% level for a one-sided test (coefficient with EXPERit ? 4 greater than that with EXPERit 2 5). The nonlinear functional form implied by the theory in equation (4) (7). Therefore, To < oo corresponds to the hypothesis that the sensitivity of compensation to performance diminishes with experience. The value of -2* log(likelihood ratio) associated with this hypothesis is 10.6, which exceeds the 1% critical value of 6.6. Therefore, as in the results that considered just two ranges of experience in equation (9), the conclusion is that the effects of performance on compensation change attenuate with experience.10
The effects of experience in equation (10) can be compared with the results in equation (9) by calculating the implied response of compensation change to performance at various levels of experience. Table 2 shows the response coefficients implied by equation (10) 0.3, 14) . 10 As in the previous case, the results are clearer for accounting earnings than for stock returns. For ARAj, alone, the hypothesis of irrelevance of EXPERi, leads to a value of -2 * log(likelihood ratio) of 8.7. For RS2j, alone, the corresponding value is 3.3. These values compare to the 5% critical value of 3.8.
" In some cases, the CEO's initial "year" in office represents a period of less than 12 months. (Recall, however, that we classify an individual as CEO only if
Relative Performance Evaluation
We now consider whether compensation change depends on performance filtered for peer-group performance. We measure peer-group results by the averages for the year and geographical region of stock returns and changes in earnings yield.12 The regional breakdown used is New England, New York City, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, South, Texas/Oklahoma, and West-see table 1. There is some arbitrariness in the selection of regions, but the breakdown should capture common regional disturbances.
The sample exhibits significant variation in performance from year to year: over the 1983-87 period (using all available data), the F-values for the joint significance of year dummies are F405 One possible interpretation of equation (11) is that the regional average values are not very good measures of the general performance that ought to be filtered out of individual performance. That is, if RS2 and ARAit were noise, it would not be surprising that the estimated coefficients of these variables would differ insignificantly from zero. The region-year dummies do have significant explanatory power for the measures of performance; that is, there are significant common influences on banks within regions and years. Also, results reported later show that the probability of CEO turnover relates significantly to the regional average of stock returns, RS2 *, given the actual returns. Hence, these results indicate that RS2i, does provide useful information.
Equation ( 11 ) tables 4 and 5) find some evidence that accounting-based performance is filtered for industrywide outcomes. However, they find little indication of this filtering for market-based As it stands, the weaker hypothesis that relative and general performance matter for changes in compensation does not impose restrictions on the data. In particular, the theory that changes in pay correspond to changes in expected marginal product does not dictate the relative magnitudes of the effects of relative and aggregate performance in the form of equation (12). We can generate testable hypotheses by reintroducing the effects of CEO experience. As discussed before, because the information content of an additional observation diminishes as the number of observations rises, the sensitivity of compensation change to relative performance falls with experience. However, the effects of aggregate performance on compensation do not interact with experience in this manner. That is, the information content of general performance has nothing to do with the experience of a particular bank's CEO. ( 13) with To unconstrained and with To unrestricted or set at infinity (in which case the last term is linear in PERFZ). The value for -2 * log(likelihood ratio) corresponding to the restriction on To is 4.7, which exceeds the 5% critical value of 3.8. Therefore, the data indicate that-holding fixed the influence of relative performance as it interacts with experience-the sensitivity of compensation change to aggregate performance diminishes with experience. In fact, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that the interaction with experience is the same for relative and general performance-that is, To = To in equation (13). The value of -2 . log(likelihood ratio) corresponding to this restriction is only 0.3.
performance. In a recent study, Gibbons and Murphy (1989, tables 1, 2) report more support for the idea that individual stock returns are filtered for overall market returns in the determination of changes in CEO compensation. The results are difficult to interpret because overall market returns matter whereas various definitions of industrywide returns do not-from an informational standpoint, the industry returns seem to be more relevant.
These findings on the interaction between aggregate performance and experience are not favorable to the theory of relative performance evaluation based on incomplete information about CEO skill. The results can, however, be rationalized by arguing that the sensitivity of CEO productivity to aggregate disturbances depends on experience for reasons that do not involve informational considerations. Under this interpretation, the acceptance of the hypothesis that To = To in equation (13) (14), the earlier lags, RSit-1 and RSit-2, are insignificant if added to the regression. Equation (14) shows that the growth of assets also relates significantly to two lags of ARA, as well as to the previous year's growth in assets. The general inference from these results is that asset growth responds to performance, but at substantially longer lags than those applicable to compensation growth. This behavior helps to explain why the logarithms of compensation and assets become less correlated over a range of CEO experience-0-4 years in table 16 The horizontal axis in fig. 2 plots log(EXPERi, + 2.4), where 2.4 is the estimate of To from before. Although this specification provides a good illustration of the data, we are unsure about the proper functional form for the relation between the correlation and experience. 17 As mentioned in n. 11 above, the initial year in office corresponds in some cases to less than 12 months. Variations in the number of months tends to worsen the correlation between measured annual pay and assets. Nevertheless, the correlation in the first year exceeds that in the second year. 3 and figure 2-in which compensation adjusts more readily than assets to performance. The eventual adjustment of assets to performance tends, however, to raise the correlation between compensation and assets at higher levels of experience.
The other element that influences the correlation between compensation and assets is the selection of the sample as experience rises. In particular, when performance is especially bad-so that compensation becomes unusually low in relation to assets-the CEO is likely to be dismissed. This truncation of the sample tends to raise the correlation between compensation and assets among the CEOs that remain. To allow for this effect, we now consider CEO turnover.
CEO Turnover
If relative performance is weak and the perceived skill of the CEO is therefore less than expected initially, the bank may discharge the CEO instead of lowering pay or allowing assets to decline to match the level of skill. Dismissal avoids the costs of having a poor match between CEO skill and bank size or the costs of shrinking the bank, but it introduces costs associated with CEO turnover. These costs include the loss of specific capital associated with the incumbent CEO.
Given observed performance for T years, the bank directors estimate the CEO's skill to be E(ki) I T as in the model that led to equation (4). The
CEO is dismissed if E(ki) I T falls below a critical value, which depends on
T and the other parameters of the model. Other things being equal, a higher critical value is more likely to result in CEO dismissal. Since the variance of E(ki) I T about the true value ki declines with T-that is, with more information-the critical value for dismissal tends to rise with T. A high critical value for CEOs with little experience is undesirable because it results in a high frequency of CEO turnover and hence in high adjustment costs.
Recall that the sensitivity of E(ki) I T to relative performance declines with T; this result implies that the responsiveness of CEO pay to relative performance diminishes with experience. However, since the critical value of E(ki) I T for dismissal rises with T, the net effect of experience on the linkage between CEO turnover and relative performance is ambiguous. Unlike the case of compensation change, the theory does not imply that the sensitivity of turnover to performance declines with experience. The other aspect of CEO turnover that differs from compensation change concerns aggregate performance variables. Aggregate disturbances can affect values of marginal products of individual CEOs and thereby influence CEO compensation. In contrast, for banks that stay in business, the decision to dismiss a CEO is based on the desire to replace the existing head with someone else. Hence the probability of termination depends on relative performance and not on aggregate performance. Therefore, although pure relative performance evaluation was rejected for the growth of compensation, it is interesting to reexamine this hypothesis in the context of CEO dismissal. Table 4 shows logit regressions for CEO turnover.'8 The dependent variable equals one if the CEO is present in year t -1 but not in year t and equals zero if the CEO is in office in both years. The data do not allow us to condition departure on "reasons" such as death or illness, fires versus quits, and so on. The right side of the equation takes the form exp(a + bx1t)/[l + exp(a + bxit)], where xi, is a vector of explanatory variables.
Three regressors capture the effects of the CEO's age. The variable AGEi,_, is the age of the CEO in year t -1-that is, in the final year in office for departing CEOs. The data come from proxy statements that typically indicate the CEO's age in February or March of year t. We took these numbers as measures of AGEit_-, that is, as the age attained by the end of the previous year. The variable AGESQI-tl-the square of AGEitallows for additional curvature in the relation between probability of departure and age.
For many CEOs, 65 is viewed as the "normal" retirement age. Given the nature of the data, this normal behavior could correspond to AGE-tj falling in a range from 63 to 66. That is, a CEO with AGEit-1 = 63 could be 64 during most of the final year in office, and one with AGEj,_1 = 66 could be 65 during most of the final year. Hence we included the dummy variable DUM6366, which equals one if AGEi,_1 is between 63 and 66 and zero otherwise. Figures 3 and 4 show the numbers of departing and continuing CEOs, respectively, at various ages (AGEit-1). For departing CEOs (N = 51), the mean age is 60.1 (SD = 6.5), and the median is 63; for continuing CEOs (N = 407), the mean is 55.4 (SD = 5.7), and the median is 56. Among the 51 departing CEOs,19 27 had ages between 63 and 66.
The other explanatory variables are the performance measures used before. Column 1 of table 4 includes, aside from the age variables, only the 2-year average stock return measured relative to the region/year average, RS2it -RS2 *. The estimated coefficient of this performance variable (-7.2, SE = 1.5) is negative and significant-meaning that better relative performance as measured by the stock market reduces the probability of CEO turnover. We consider the effects of performance further below.
Each of the three age variables are statistically significant. The estimated 18 The results are essentially the same with a probit formulation. Previous studies that fit logit models for CEO turnover include Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), and Weisbach (1988) . 19 This number differs from the 60 new CEOs in the sample because of missing data on AGEI-t-or on other variables that enter into the logit regressions. We tested the hypothesis that the coefficients of AGEIt_-, AGESQIt-1, and RS2jt-RS2 were the same over the age range 63-66 as for all other ages. (Given the small number of observations, it does not matter which group contains the values with ages above 66.) The test statistic is -2* log(likelihood ratio) = 4.2, which is less than the 5% critical value of 7.8. Therefore, a different intercept (the variable DUM6366) is sufficient to account for the differing behavior around the normal retirement age of 65. In particular, the estimated coefficient of RS2t -RS2 is significantly negative when estimated only over the subsample of CEOs aged between 63 and 66 (59 observations, of which 27 are of CEO departures). The estimated coefficient for this subsample is -7.3, SE = 3.2. Thus, even around age 65, CEOs who perform better are significantly less likely to depart.20
Consider now further aspects of the relation between CEO departure and performance. Column 2 of table 4 allows for separate coefficients on RSit1 -RS*> and RSU-2-RS>*t2 in the logit regression. As in the case of compensation growth, the two estimated coefficients are nearly equal, so that the 2-year average variable RS2it -RS2 ~ -used in column 1 of the table-is satisfactory.
Column 3 of the table adds the region-relative change in the earnings yield, ARAt-1 -ARA*-,. The estimated coefficient is negative but insignificant: -2.0, SE = 3.4. Thus, unlike compensation growth, the probability of CEO departure is not significantly related to accounting-based performance.
Column 4 separates the stock-market performance into the actual return, RS2itj, and the regional average return, RS2>*-1. The estimated coefficients are opposite in sign and of similar magnitude: -7.5 (1.6) and 6.1 (1.9), respectively. A test of the pure relative performance hypothesis-that the coefficients are of equal magnitude but opposite in sign-leads to the value of -2 l log(likelihood ratio) of 1.0, which is well below the 5% critical value of 3.8. Thus, pure relative performance evaluation is accepted here. The acceptance of the hypothesis of relative performance evaluation for the probability of CEO departure contrasts with the results for compensation growth. Thus, the indication is that CEO turnover depends on relative performance, whereas compensation growth depends on relative and aggregate performance. These results are consistent with the theory in which compensation growth corresponds to the change in expected marginal product, but turnover involves a comparison of the existing CEO with alternative executives.
Column 6 of table 4 shows that an additional lag of the stock-return variable, RS-_ -RS2 *-3, is insignificant. Hence the main response of CEO turnover to market-based performance occurs over a 2-year period. Column 7 adds another lag of accounting-based performance. The estimated coefficient of ARAU-2 -ARA,*2 is negative but insignificant: -7.7, SE = 5.2. The introduction of this second lag raises the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of the first lag, ARA--, -ARA*2, to-4.5, SE = 4.0. The two lags of accounting-based relative performance are, however, jointly insignificant: the value of -2 log(likelihood ratio) is 2.6, which is below the 5% critical value of 6.0. Hence the conclusion again is that the probability of CEO turnover does not relate significantly to accountingbased performance.22
Our finding is that market-and accounting-based performances are each important for compensation growth, whereas only the market-based measure is significant for turnover probability. A possible explanation involves the idea of Gibbons and Murphy (1988) that accounting earnings are prone to manipulation by the CEO in the short run. For CEOs who are close to the margin of being dismissed-because they have performed badlythe horizon is short, and the incentive to manipulate the accounting numbers is great. For this reason, a decision to terminate the CEO gives little weight to accounting earnings and relies instead on stock returns or other data that are relatively immune from manipulation.
Column 8 of table 4 divides RS1t -RS>1 into ranges in which CEO experience is below or above the median (EXPERit c 4 and 2 5, respectively). The estimated coefficients in the two ranges are very close; therefore the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the sensitivity of turnover to performance is independent of experience. (The test statistic is 0.1 with a 5% critical value of 3.8.) This result on experience is another contrast with the findings for compensation growth; in that case theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence showed that compensation change was more sensitive to performance at lower levels of experience. For CEO turnover, and Murphy (1989, the theoretical effect of experience is ambiguous, and the empirical effect turns out to be indistinguishable from zero.
It is possible that CEO turnover reflects mismatches in either directionthe CEO is either too bad or too good for the bank-rather than poor performance, per se. If mismatches in either direction are important, the probability of CEO departure would rise with the magnitude of relative performance. We added the absolute value of RS2-t_1 -RS2>*-to the regression in column 1 of table 4. The estimated coefficient of this absolute value has the "wrong" sign and differs insignificantly from zero: -3.4 (SE = 3.4), whereas that of the algebraic value, RS2it_1 -RS2>*t1, remains significantly negative: -9.2 (SE = 2.7). Thus the results indicate that CEOs who perform much better than expected are especially likely to remain with the bank, rather than tending to move to another (larger) bank that is a better match for their unexpectedly high skill. One reason that this type of move tends not to occur is that the match between CEO talent and bank size can be improved by expanding the size of the bank, as in equation (14) .
Given the results shown in table 4, the main effects of performance on the probability of CEO turnover are captured by the logit regression in column 1, which includes RS2it1 -RS2>*_1 as the only performance variable. To evaluate the performance effects quantitatively, note that the logit form implies that the derivative of the logarithm of the departure probability with respect to the relative stock return is 13(1 -p), where 1 is the regression coefficient (-7.2) and p is the probability of departure.23 For example, if RS2it_ -RS2>it-= 0, the derivative at age 55 is -7.0, which means that an increase by .01 in the stock return reduces the departure probability by 7%/from .033 to .031. At age 65, the derivative is -4.0, so that an increase by .01 in the return lowers the probability by 4%/from .45 to .43. Table 6 shows the estimated probability of departure (based on the logit regression in col. 1 of table 4) at ages 50, 60, and 65 and for relative stock returns between .32 and -.32. Since the sample standard deviation of RS2-ti -RS2>1 is .16, the range for relative returns is a two-standard-error band about the mean. The estimated values in table 6 are basically the fitted values corresponding to the observed frequencies of departures that were shown before in table 5.
Summary of Major Findings and Conclusions
We studied compensation for bank CEOs by examining the match between levels of pay and bank size for newly hired chief executives. The elasticity of about one-third for compensation in relation to assets is in line with previous estimates for other industries and time periods. For CEOs who continue in office, the growth of compensation varies positively with performance measures based on stock returns and accounting earnings. The sensitivity of compensation change to performance declines significantly as CEO experience increases. We interpreted this effect in terms of the declining information content of additional observations on performance.
There is no indication that individual bank performance is filtered for regional average performance in the relation with compensation growth; in particular, the data reject the hypothesis that only relative performance affects the change in compensation. The results are consistent with a theory in which the growth in pay equals the growth in expected marginal product; in this case, CEO pay responds to relative and aggregate performance. In contrast, the findings are inconsistent with the existence of agreements that fully shield CEO compensation from aggregate risks.
Since compensation growth reacts to stock returns and accounting earnings, but not to growth in assets, the correlation between the levels of compensation and assets-which reflects the match between the quality of the CEO and the size of the organization-tends to worsen as tenure increases. Empirically, this correlation declines as experience rises from 0 to 4 years (the sample median) but subsequently increases to a level comparable to that for new CEOs. One mechanism that raises the correlation at higher levels of experience is the lagged response of bank assets to performance. Another element is the truncation of the sample, via CEO departure, to eliminate the executives whose performance is especially bad.
We estimated logit regressions to relate the probability of CEO departure to age and performance. The probability of departure rises with age (for ages above the early 50s) and becomes particularly high in the normal retirement span around age 65. Even around age 65, the probability of departure declines significantly with better performance.
The main findings for the relation between CEO turnover and performance are that, first, the departure probability falls significantly with stock returns but not with accounting earnings; second, the effects of stock returns enter relative to regional average returns; and third, the sensitivity of departure probability to stock returns does not vary significantly with CEO experience. The potential for manipulation of the accounting results may explain why accounting-based performance is unimportant for turnover but is significant for compensation growth (CEOs who are close to the margin of termination have short horizons and are therefore more likely to engage in earnings manipulation). The success of relative performance evaluation in the context of CEO turnover accords with a model in which dismissal involves a comparison of the incumbent with alternative chief executives. This model is also consistent with the result that the sensitivity of CEO departure to performance does not vary systematically with experience. 
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